Machine generated contents note: 1.Introduction -- 2.Continuous Normal-Form Games -- 2.1.Notation and Definitions -- 2.2.Existence of Nash Equilibria -- 2.3.Mixed Strategies -- 2.4.Stability of Nash Equilibria -- 2.5.Existence of Nash Equilibria via Approximate Equilibria -- 3.Generalized Better-Reply Secure Games -- 3.1.Generalized Better-Reply Security and Existence of Equilibrium -- 3.2.Examples -- 3.3.Two Characterizations of Generalized Better-Reply Security -- 3.4.Better-Reply Security -- 3.5.Sufficient Conditions -- 3.6.Mixed Strategies -- 3.7.References -- 4.Stronger Existence Results -- 4.1.Multi-Player Well-Behaved Security -- 4.2.Diagonal Transfer Continuity -- 4.3.Generalized C-Security -- 4.4.Lower Single-Deviation Property -- 4.5.Generalized Weak Transfer Continuity -- 4.6.References -- 5.Limit Results -- 5.1.A General Limit Result -- 5.2.Two Characterization of the Limit Problem for ε-Equilibria -- 5.3.Sufficient Conditions for Limit Results --

Contents note continued: 5.4.Existence of ε-Equilibrium -- 5.5.Continuity of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence -- 5.6.Strategic Approximation -- 5.7.References -- 6.Games With an Endogenous Sharing Rule -- 6.1.Existence and Stability of Solutions -- 6.2.References -- 7.Games With a Continuum of Players -- 7.1.Notation and Definitions -- 7.2.Existence of Equilibrium Distributions -- 7.3.Relationship With Finite-Player Games -- 7.4.Proof of the Existence Theorem for Non-atomic Games -- 7.5.References.