Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games -- Limit games and limit equilibria -- Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players -- Finite player approximations to a continuum of players -- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements -- When are nonanymous players negligible? -- Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player -- Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed -- Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent -- When is reputation bad? -- The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information -- The folk theorem with imperfect public information -- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players -- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information -- The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with communications and approximate common knowledge in two player games -- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient -- Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.