Machine generated contents note: 1.Introduction -- 1.1.A perspective on banking crises, liquidity, and credit lines -- 1.2.A glimpse of the main contents -- 1.3.Plan of the book -- 2.Bank solvency and systemic stability -- 2.1.Diversifiable risks -- 2.2.Non-diversifiable risks and capital -- 2.3.Non-diversifiable risks and liquidity -- 3.The rationale for demand deposits (and short-term funds) -- 3.1.Demand deposits as money -- 3.2.Demand deposits for consumption smoothing -- 3.3.Demand deposits as a check on moral hazard -- 4.Literature review, and the road ahead -- 4.1.Banking crises and liquidity -- 4.2.Credit lines -- 4.3.The road ahead -- Appendix: storage technology -- 5.Near-systemic bank runs, given a flexible more-reputed bank -- 5.1.Reserves -- 5.2.Liquid loans: purchase of loans by the more-reputed bank -- 5.3.Illiquid loans: near lender of last resort -- 5.4.Illiquid loans: line of credit from the more-reputed bank --

Contents note continued: 5.5.A model of a possible market for lines of credit -- 5.6.Price-level stability and near-systemic bank runs -- 5.7.A two-way credit line and a mediator -- 5.8.Competition and stability -- 6.Systemic bank runs, given a flexible central bank -- 6.1.Reserves -- 6.2.Liquid loans: purchase of loans by the central bank -- 6.3.Illiquid loans: lender of last resort -- 6.4.Illiquid loans: lines of credit from the central bank -- 6.5.A model of possible quasi-market for lines of credit -- 6.6.Price-level stability and systemic bank runs -- 6.7.Systemic runs and near-systemic runs: a comparison -- 6.8.Hypothetical and actual central banks, past and present -- 7.Systemic bank runs under the gold standard -- 7.1.Gold reserves -- 7.2.Liquid loans: purchase of loans by the `gold company' -- 7.3.Illiquid loans: hypothetical lender of last resort -- 7.4.Illiquid loans: a line of credit from the `gold company' -- 7.5.A credit line model and a plausible market failure --

Contents note continued: 7.6.Market price of gold, and systemic bank runs -- 7.7.`Gold company' and central bank: a comparison -- 8.Implications of inelastic supply of desired assets -- 8.1.Inelastic issue of deposits by the rigid more-reputed bank -- 8.2.Inelastic issue of currency by the rigid central bank -- 8.3.Inelastic supply of gold under the gold standard -- 8.4.Inelastic supply of desired assets, and the real sector -- 9.Bank runs, portfolio choice, and adjustment mechanism -- 9.1.Banking crisis vis-a-vis stock market crash -- 9.2.Flex-price assets and fix-price assets -- 9.3.Price elasticity of supply, and non-price elasticity of supply -- 9.4.Redemption and exchange: a distinction I -- 9.5.Price adjustment and quantity adjustment -- 9.6.Deposit insurance for reasons of liquidity -- 10.Bank runs, liquidity, and consumption smoothing -- 10.1.Redemption and exchange: a distinction II -- 10.2.Real and non-real liquidity shock --

Contents note continued: 10.3.Consumption smoothing in a broad perspective -- 10.4.Liquidity shocks in the pre-1983 and the post-1983 literature -- 10.5.Market liquidity, funding liquidity, and bank runs -- 10.6.Two types of lines of credit -- Appendix: inside liquidity, outside liquidity, and bank runs -- 11.Bank runs and the broad policy framework -- 11.1.Narrow monetary policy -- 11.2.Extended fiscal policy -- 11.3.Government's budget constraint -- 12.Sudden capital outflow, emerging economies, and credit lines -- 12.1.International near-systemic bank runs -- 12.2.Two countries with the same numeraire -- 12.3.Two countries with different numeraire -- 12.4.International central bank-pros and cons -- 12.5.Extending the basic analysis -- 13.One hundred per cent reserve banking, and the nature of inefficiency -- 13.1.The nature of inefficiency -- 13.2.Credit creation by the commercial banking system -- 13.3.Credit creation by the entire banking system --

Contents note continued: 14.More on banking crises and liquidity -- 14.1.Endogenous narrow banking -- 14.2.Pseudo liquidity crunch -- 14.3.Run on currency (redeemable and irredeemable) -- 14.4.An alternative to a possible positive effect of bank runs -- 14.5.Demand deposits and time deposits -- 14.6.Deposit insurance for reasons other than liquidity -- 15.Theory and experience -- 15.1.The Great Depression -- 15.2.The East Asian crisis of 1997-98 -- 15.3.The financial crisis of 2008 -- 15.4.Policy lessons -- 16.Conclusions -- 16.1.Summary -- 16.2.General overview.