The political geography of inequality : regions and redistribution

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Title:

Author:

Beramendi, Pablo.

ISBN:

9781107008137

9781107400467

Personal Author:

Beramendi, Pablo.

Publication Information:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Physical Description:

xvi, 295 s. : ill. ; 24 cm.

Series:

Cambridge studies in comparative politics

General Note:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents:

1. Regions and redistribution: introduction and overview; 2. A theory of fisc structures in political unions; 3. The road ahead: the empirical strategy; 4. The European Union: economic geography and fiscal structures under centrifugal representation; 5. North America's divide: distributive tensions, risk sharing and the centralization of public insurance in federations; 6. Germany's reunification: distributive tensions and fiscal structures under centripetal representation; 7. Endogenous decentralization and welfare resilience: Spain, 1978-2007; 8. The political geography of inequality: summary and implications.

Abstract:

Subject Term:

Regionalism.

Equality.

Comparative government.

Geographic Term:

European Union countries -- Economic conditions -- Regional disparities.

North America -- Economic conditions -- Regional disparities.

Added Author:

Beramendi, Pablo.

Copies:

Available:*

Library	Material Type	Item Barcode	Shelf Number	Copy	Status
Searching... 1:IIEMSA	1:GEN-BOOK	33168025594900	320.011 B482P 2012	1	Searching... Unknown

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Summary

This book addresses two questions - why some political systems have more centralized systems of interpersonal redistribution than others, and why some political unions make larger efforts to equalize resources among their constituent units than others. This book presents a new theory of the origin of fiscal structures in systems with several levels of government. The argument points to two major factors to account for the variation in redistribution: the interplay between economic geography and political representation on the one hand, and the scope of interregional economic externalities on the other. To test the empirical implications derived from the argument, the book relies on in-depth studies of the choice of fiscal structures in unions as diverse as the European Union, Canada and the United States in the aftermath of the Great Depression; Germany before and after Reunification; and Spain after the transition to democracy.